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Critics of Dewey’s metaphysics point to his dismissal of any philosophy which lo-
cates ideals in a realm beyond experience. However, Dewey’s sustained critique of 
dualistic philosophies is but a fi rst step in his reconstruction and recovery of the 
function of the metaphysical. Detaching the discussion of values from inquiry, 
whether scientifi c, philosophical, or educational, produces the same end as rel-
egating values to a transcendent realm that is beyond ordinary human discourse. 
Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics supports his progressive educational philosophy. 
Th e duty of education is grounded in its service to democracy; it must help students 
develop the ability to express, discuss, and develop their moral reasoning through 
experiential and experimental learning.
Th ere may be two or three truths in professional philosophy, even for those who 
work in American pragmatism: Old debates never die, and new debates are oft en 
restatements of old debates. And the same technical term or concept means dif-
ferent things to diff erent people—sometimes even to the same person. Th e debate 
over the terms of pragmatism is especially prevalent in Dewey studies, where battle 
lines have been drawn between those who read Dewey as a naturalist who eschews 
even the slightest hint of the metaphysical, and those who fi nd in Dewey a prag-
matist whose naturalism is complemented by a reconstructed metaphysics, which 
is a necessary component of his instrumental philosophy. Melvin Rogers (2009a) 
correctly points out the “industry of commentary on this formulation of Dewey’s 
that makes him the problem, rather than framing investigations into Dewey from 
the perspective of the problem he seeks to address” (100). Writing in the pages of 
Education and Culture, Gert J. J. Biesta has challenged scholars of Dewey to incor-
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porate the purpose of his pragmatism into the study of his philosophical method: 
“As long as we approach Dewey’s philosophy just as a philosophy, that is, as long 
as we engage with his work at the level of his beliefs rather than in function of the 
wider problem he sought to address, we severely restrict the opportunities that his 
pragmatism has to off er for dealing with the problems that characterize our global 
condition at the dawn of the twenty-fi rst century: problems that have to do with 
intercultural, interethnic, and, not in the least, interreligious communication and 
understanding” (35). It is very much in this spirit that I will both criticize those 
philosophers who deny that Dewey off ers a metaphysics and explain the value and 
signifi cance of his naturalistic metaphysics in terms of his philosophy of education.
When we read Dewey’s metaphysics as a corrective to traditional metaphysics 
and materialism, its central role in his overall philosophy becomes clear. At stake is 
a more helpful reading of Dewey which focuses on the specifi c methods and goals 
of his philosophical approach—an approach which in many ways refl ects the me-
lioristic and democratic goals of his work. Th e problems Dewey addresses play out 
most forcefully in his work on education, where some educational methodologies 
are shown to share a great deal with traditional metaphysics. Dewey’s dismissal of 
distant, fi xed, and permanent moral truths fi nds expression in his critique of certain 
methods of moral education; neither is able to generate the type of moral training or 
reasoning which is crucial to the success of the democratic culture Dewey celebrates 
and nurtures. To make my case, I will revisit his exchanges with one of the fi rst crit-
ics of his metaphysics, George Santayana, and review the recent debate in the work 
of Richard Rorty, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, William T. Myers, John R. Shook, 
and others. Finally, I will off er a functionalist defi nition of Dewey’s naturalistic 
metaphysics, and examine its application in some of his central work in education.
Th ose who reject the idea that Dewey off ers a metaphysics argue that he turns 
away from the transcendental, supernatural, or absolute, toward a progressive un-
derstanding of culture, duty, and education which does not look to anything be-
yond, or more than the data of simple experience. Th is version of Dewey masks or 
ignores the larger task he sets for philosophy as a critical voice in democratic culture. 
Th e public role of philosophy, according to Dewey, is predicated on the recognition 
that ideals are encountered, as well as generated, through experience, and not en-
dowed by a divine power or imparted by tradition. Some recent pragmatists, most 
notably Richard Rorty, embrace Dewey based on a reading which has him reject-
ing the constructive role of philosophy in public discourse as well as metaphysics 
tout court. Th eir objections, as we will see, are to another mode of metaphysical 
speculation which seems to have a monopoly in the fi eld, which posits the very es-
sences Dewey spent his career dismissing as anathema to his instrumentalist phi-
losophy. Many who disagree with the picture of Dewey which Rorty sketches—as 
a philosopher moving beyond philosophy—agree with him that Dewey does not 
off er a reconstructed metaphysics. 
I part company with both critiques, arguing instead that Dewey emphasizes 
his criticism of metaphysics not for the purposes of dismantling it, but in order to 
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reconstruct and to put it to use in his pragmatism. In fact, Dewey explicitly claims 
that his instrumentalism depends on a metaphysics which he defi nes as forward 
looking, plastic, and concerned with the betterment of society. In this sense, meta-
physics modifi es naturalism by off ering an examination both of the general charac-
teristics of nature as experienced, and the values and function of these experiences 
in society as it seeks to improve itself. Th is understanding of naturalistic metaphys-
ics is missed in the current debate.
Th e central thesis of this paper is that Dewey reconstructs, but does not 
abandon metaphysics. To do this, he recognizes a socially constructed ideal realm 
which is generated from and supports experience. Unlike traditional philosophical 
metaphysics, the ideal in Dewey is neither fi xed nor absolute. Just as Dewey rejects 
any dualism which divides the ideal from the real, his reconstructed metaphysics 
does not posit an essential and timeless realm above experience. Rather, the two 
are mutual and complementary. Th ere is no hard divide between nature or experi-
ence, “what is causally effi  cacious,” and values or ideals (Detar, 28). My reading of 
Dewey’s metaphysics diff ers from others which might be sympathetic. Richard Ber-
nstein supports the “naturalistic metaphysics” line of interpretation. He describes 
metaphysics as "the study of the generic traits of existence; it is descriptive, empiri-
cal, and hypothetical" (5). Th is second standard defi nition of metaphysics—which 
is meant to compete with the supernatural or ideal version—does not suffi  ciently 
express the moral function of metaphysics Dewey recovers. 
One of the primary goals of Dewey’s pragmatism was to animate the moral life 
of nature and culture. He does this expressly in his educational philosophy, where 
the consequences of certain metaphysical assumptions play out with great force. In 
an autobiographical essay published in 1930, “From Absolutism to Experimental-
ism,” Dewey derides the “intellectual scandal” of the division between science and 
morals. Th e creation of “a method of eff ective inquiry, which would apply without 
abrupt breach of continuity to the fi elds designated by both of these words, is at 
once our needed theoretical solvent and the supply of our greatest practical want.” 
Dewey describes this cause as the central motivation for his instrumentalism ([1930] 
1984c, 156-57). Dewey oft en defi nes his instrumentalism in terms of its application 
in education and philosophy of education. Th e methods of both require “draw[ing] . 
. . original material as to ends and value from actual experience in education, but . . . 
goes back to these experiences for testing, confi rmation, modifi cation, and the pro-
vision of further materials” ([1929] 1984b, 30). Th e primary signifi cance of Dewey’s 
naturalistic metaphysics for philosophers of education is found in his claim that 
values can be and are taught through experience and experimentalism. In other 
words, moral character is not developed adequately when ideals are situated beyond 
experience, understood as fi xed principles, and accessed through rote learning.
Scholars of education appreciate that pragmatism might be naturalistic, sup-
port a concept of the self as socially embodied, and advocate toleration and the 
pluralistic respect for certain ideals which refl ect all of the above. Nel Noddings 
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connects the approach to education in Dewey with his overall goals: “For Dewey, 
ways and means and ends and outcomes form a whole. We cannot use dictatorial 
means to educate democratic citizens.” Democratic citizenship “entails powers of 
self-direction, administration, and responsibility. Training in mere obedience is in-
suffi  cient” (481). Susan Jean Mayer notes that democracy is a moral ideal for Dewey 
(50), and that his appreciation of “the social nature of humankind” (52) is deeply 
connected with his rejection of instruction which does not demand critique and 
experiment. Th e best teacher does not present knowledge as fait accompli, but rather 
motivates, inspires, and guides (57). Again, the sustained criticisms of absolutism, 
and the advocacy for instrumentalism and pluralism in Dewey’s philosophical 
works, fi nd their practical expression in his philosophy of education.
Lines of Interpretation 
In addition to clarifying Dewey’s use of terminology, I will need to answer the ques-
tion of what is gained by emphasizing Dewey’s reconstructed metaphysics. To do 
this, of course, I will make the case that a great deal is lost by interpreters who claim 
that Dewey dismisses all metaphysics. My reading of Dewey throws into question 
the persistent interpretation, best exemplifi ed by Richard Rorty, which has Dewey 
leaving behind not just metaphysics, but philosophy, too. For Rorty, the motivations 
for abandoning metaphysics (refusal to celebrate essences, a priori truths, ideal and 
transcendent realms of existents, etc.) should lead one to move beyond philosophy. 
Th is is decidedly not the case with Dewey. A brief note on perhaps the most widely 
known interpreter of Dewey is necessary. 
Rorty dismisses any possibility that Dewey’s work produces a metaphysics, in 
line with his assertions that Dewey does not practice philosophy in any traditional 
sense. Still, Rorty identifi es two Deweys: one who refuses to abandon the vocabulary 
of traditional metaphysics, and another who shares with Rorty a sense of philo-
sophical irony. Rorty—and his preferred Dewey—have moved beyond philosophy’s 
traditional epistemological engagements with questions of truth and reality. Th is 
rendition of pragmatism does not fi t the engaged, public, and active philosophy I 
fi nd Dewey proposing. Rorty’s liberalism does not fi t Dewey’s, either. As Richard 
Shusterman writes, “long-term friends and pragmatist fellow travelers like Richard 
Bernstein are dismayed at how Dewey’s radical and clearly anticapitalist liberalism 
is being distorted” by Rorty (Shusterman, 391-92). Shusterman is less interested in 
grading “Rorty’s fi delity” to Dewey, and more in tracing the “philosophical roots” 
of their divergences (392). In line with this goal, Shusterman writes that Rorty “re-
jects what he sees as Dewey’s privileging of natural science over literary culture, 
just as he refuses to countenance philosophical discourse that traffi  cs, as Dewey’s 
does, with nonlinguistic entities like experiences or ideas” (391). While I will try 
to avoid off ering the kind of exercise in “historical purism” Shusterman dislikes, 
I will make the case that things like ideas are central in Dewey’s metaphysics, and 
that dismissing these central tools in his work strips Dewey’s philosophy both of 
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its goals and the means of achieving them. Shusterman understands “Dewey’s at-
tack on the metaphysics of traditional liberalism” to be a defense of the “collab-
orative eff ort to achieve greater frequency and security for these desired ends in a 
changing and contingent world whose future can in some measure be infl uenced 
and improved by human action and experimental intelligence.” Dewey opts for a 
demanding meliorism in place of an almost quietest metaphysics which holds that 
“individual liberty rest[s] on ontological and inalienable givens of human nature” 
(Shusterman, 393-94). 
Dewey’s rejection of this second type of metaphysics does not imply that he 
rejects metaphysics outright. Th is may be the point of departure for Dewey and 
Rorty’s respective liberalisms; Dewey imagines a “central” role for philosophy in 
“sociopolitical reform, not by deducing ontological foundations for such reform, but 
by imagining the best ends and means for it” (Shusterman, 403). Rorty can neither 
imagine any use for metaphysics, nor any useful public philosophy. Gregory Pappas 
points out that “if the only way philosophy can provide justifi cation for our demo-
cratic aspirations is in the form of a knowledge foundation or from some histori-
cal objective standpoint, then Dewey has failed as a defender of democracy. Such 
failure is assumed by Richard Rorty, who believes that a pragmatist must abandon, 
once and for all, the notion that she can provide a philosophical justifi cation for 
democracy or any other way of life” (Pappas, 260-62). David L. Hildebrand’s as-
sessment of Rorty on Dewey is particularly helpful in showing both the purpose of 
Dewey’s metaphysics, and its grounding in naturalism. In short, he writes “Rorty 
is convinced that attempts to systematically describe the world in general terms are 
either banal statements of the obvious or the thinly disguised religious dogma of 
self-appointed priests. But Dewey showed another alternative was possible: meta-
physics could investigate the world empirically and hypothetically” (116). Dewey’s 
metaphysics modifi es naturalism, and ensures that it does not become positivistic 
and reductively materialist; reconstructing metaphysics also revives empiricism—it 
allows Dewey to put experience to use in ways Rorty disavows.
Without doubt, Dewey does not present his metaphysics as an “attempt to 
fi nd an independent Being on which mere encountered Nature depends” (Randall, 
404). Dewey (and John Herman Randall) reclaim metaphysics as a mode of critique 
and inquiry whose focus is “productive” and not “purely theoretical” (Boisvert 
1988, 104). But the metaphysics which Dewey reconstructs, while analyzing the 
“generic traits of existence,” does not easily fi t the model Randall identifi es as the 
Aristotelian model.1 James Gouinlock notes that Dewey’s metaphysics is natural 
and not Idealist, and that “what is emphasized with unrelieved urgency is that any 
and every mode of experience is evidential of the traits of nature. Not only know-
ing, but valuing, loving, worshipping, desiring, and dreaming also go on in nature; 
and the metaphysical inquiry concerns what are the irreducible traits of that nature 
in which such diversity of events occur” (6). Th e goal is neither simply explanatory 
nor “mere intellectual entertainment,” but “to discern, describe, and explain the 
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function of the pervasive characteristics of experience” (9, 39). Again, critics of 
Dewey’s metaphysics overlook its purpose and function, especially its application 
in his philosophy of education.
Th e debate over Dewey’s metaphysics begins in his own exchanges with San-
tayana, and extends immediately aft er Dewey’s death through successive genera-
tions of interpreters.  R. W. Sleeper (1960) defends Dewey against Morton White 
and George Geiger, who accept Dewey’s philosophical methodological innovations 
stripped of the “metaphysical perspective which accompanies them” (101). Sleeper 
makes the point that “not all naturalism is anti-metaphysical,” adding the helpful 
defi nition from John Herman Randall, Jr. that “the function of metaphysics is criti-
cal,” and that metaphysics is “the ground-map of the province of criticism” (102).2 
Gouinlock concurs in much the same language:
A naturalistic metaphysics provides a “ground-map” of criticism in the 
obvious sense that it makes clear the continuities and intermixtures of the 
traits of nature and it displays their function in various kinds of experience. 
Th us it makes criticism of values both intelligible and effi  cacious. If only 
implicitly, any coherent and eff ective theory of criticism must presuppose 
a metaphysics that characterizes nature at least as thoroughly and faith-
fully as that of Dewey. (41)
Dewey’s metaphysics may be short-sighted; and perhaps it is naive in its re-
gard of science’s implicit reductionism. But Dewey is undoubtedly working on a 
metaphysics which fi ts with and serves his naturalism.
Revisiting Dewey’s response to Santayana allows me to make the case as 
strongly as possible that Dewey intentionally and explicitly embraces a reconstructed 
metaphysics which he believes brings out aspects of nature ignored by both science 
and traditional metaphysics. 
Dewey and Santayana 
Well before Rorty, Seigfried, Myers, Shook, and others examined the characteristic 
elements of a pragmatist metaphysics, John Dewey and George Santayana debated 
the same basic set of questions. Many of the terms Santayana and Dewey use are 
identical, though most of the meanings are signifi cantly diff erent. For our purposes, 
Santayana’s charge against Dewey parallels the current line that pragmatism (and 
naturalism) cannot be metaphysical, and that metaphysics precludes naturalism.
Santayana (1925) published one of the fi rst critiques of Dewey’s Experience 
and Nature, oft en read as the central statement of Dewey’s metaphysics. He opens 
his essay with the question most readers of Experience and Nature ask at some point: 
“In what sense is this system naturalistic? In what sense is it metaphysical? How 
comes it that these two characters (which to me seem contradictory) can be united 
in this philosophy?” (673). Santayana’s questions follow his own understanding of 
nature. As in many of his writings, reasonable assumptions build to unexpected 
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conclusions. Santayana describes naturalism as “a primary system, or rather it is not 
a special system at all, but the spontaneous and inevitable body of beliefs involved 
in animal life.” “Th is boyish universe,” he continues, “is indefi nitely extensible on 
its own plane; it may have heaven around it and fairyland in its interstices; it covers 
the whole fi eld of possible material action to its uttermost reaches. It is the world 
of naturalism. On this material framework it is easy to hang all the immaterial 
objects, such as words, feelings, and ideas, which may be eventually distinguished 
in human experience” (674). Santayana’s defi nition of nature works especially well 
in the context of traditional metaphysics. Nature is taken to be devoid of value in 
itself. Santayana distinguishes between material nature, and the immaterial realm 
of ideas which lend signifi cance to it. 
Clearly, Santayana understands the commonsense use of naturalism by Dewey 
and many others; his rendition of nature in explicitly non-naturalistic terms is 
predicated on his own Platonic dualism. Against nature, Santayana (1925) sets his 
defi nition of the metaphysical:
Naturalism will break down, however, so soon as words, ideas, or spir-
its are taken to be substantial on their own account, and powers at work 
prior to the existence of their organs, or independent of them. Now it is 
precisely such disembodied powers and immaterial functions prior to mat-
ter that are called metaphysical. Transcendentalism is not metaphysical as 
it remains a mere method, because then it might express the natural fact 
that any animal mind is its own center and must awake in order to know 
anything: it becomes metaphysical when this mind is said to be absolute, 
single, and without material conditions. To admit anything metaphysical 
in this sense is evidently to abandon naturalism. (674)
Santayana’s description has little connection with the metaphysics Dewey re-
covers. One would be hard-pressed to fi nd examples of “disembodied powers” and 
“immaterial functions” in Dewey. Likewise, Dewey does not argue that the human 
mind is “without material conditions.” Instead, Dewey replaces mind-matter du-
alism with experience. Santayana (1925) recognizes this argument in Dewey, too: 
“Th ere cannot be any actual mind in experience except the experience itself” (677). 
Th e defi nition Santayana off ers both assumes and depends on a hard distinction 
between material nature and the realm of the absolute and ideal. He assumes that 
naturalism and metaphysics are mutually exclusive.
In order to defend against Dewey’s inevitable rebuttal, Santayana (1925) pres-
ents nature in distinctly anti-Deweyan terms. “In nature there is no foreground or 
background, no here, no now, no moral cathedra, no centre so really central as to 
reduce all other things to mere margins and mere perspectives. A foreground is by 
defi nition relative to some chosen point of view, to the station assumed in the midst 
of nature by some creature tethered by fortune to a particular time and place. If 
such a foreground becomes dominant in a philosophy naturalism is abandoned” 
(678-79).3 While Santayana is correct that Dewey builds or enacts a metaphysics 
Dewey’s Naturalistic Metaphysics: Expostulations and Replies    55
Volume 27 (2)  2011
which takes human experience as its foreground, Dewey is nevertheless able to 
fi nd value and meaning in nature without appealing to the supernatural. Dewey’s 
reconstructed metaphysics is naturalistic, because of his recovery of the function 
of metaphysics as a way to locate value and meaning in and through experience.
Th is criticism of Dewey, and the misreading of experience, only make sense if 
we accept Santayana’s (1925) claim that events in nature do not involve active par-
ticipants, “just the fl ow of nature, the transit of an essence” (682). Th e perspective 
of the individual in nature is irrelevant for Santayana. According to him, nature is 
displaced in Dewey by history. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Santayana’s 
naturalism resists the potential and value of human experience. Th e language or 
metaphor of illusion, dream, image, and symbol dominate his description of the 
relation between nature and experience (Santayana 1921, 704, 705). 
For Santayana (1925), nature trumps experience, and “laughs at our dialectic 
and goes on living in her own way” (682). Human existence is but a “waking dream” 
(684). Santayana (1921) embraces his idiosyncratic naturalism, claiming that it “is 
not at all afraid of the latest theories of space, time, or matter: what I understand 
of them, I like, and am ready to believe: for I am a follower of Plato in his doctrine 
that only knowledge of ideas (if we may call it knowledge) can be literal and exact, 
whilst practical knowledge is necessarily mythical in form, precisely because its 
object exists and is external to us” (706). Th e problem is not that Santayana gets 
Dewey wrong; the problem is that Santayana’s naturalism, in Dewey’s words, is “half-
hearted,” while his metaphysical commitments are dominant (1927, 57). Santayana 
enjoys the same rhetorical fl ourish in Platonism and the Spiritual Life (1957), where 
he writes: “For my purpose, however, it is fortunately unimportant to dispel these 
ambiguities, dear to half-hearted philosophies, because the Platonic doctrine at 
least is clear. If for the Platonist goods and evils are everlastingly fi xed and distinct, 
this moral dogmatism in him is no accident of temperament, no mere lack of moral 
elasticity, as in the bigot. Life, he thinks, has been kindled and is alone sustained by 
the infl uence of pre-existing celestial models” (227). Santayana defends the Platonic 
conception of nature, but not the current conception of naturalism.
Dewey (1927) begins his reply by quoting Santayana’s claim that “I am myself 
a dogmatic naturalist” (57). Santayana’s naturalism, according to Dewey, “reduces 
itself to a vague gesture of adoring faith in some all-comprehensive unknowable 
in contrast with which all human life—barring this one gesture—is specious and 
illusory” (64). “In short,” Dewey notes, “his presupposition is a break between na-
ture and man; man in the sense of anything more than a physically extended body, 
man as institutions, culture, ‘experience.’ Th e former is real, substantial; the lat-
ter specious, deceptive, since it has centers and perspectives” (58). Th e alternative 
dualistic universe, in which mere matter and experience are both set against and 
dependent on an immaterial realm is “a hang-over of an intellectual convention 
which developed and fl ourished in physics at a particular stage of history” (58). 
Dewey’s dogma is the insistence that ideals change, but must always emerge from 
and serve democratic culture.
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In his rebuttal to Santayana, Dewey (1927) repeatedly refers to his own natu-
ralism as a method for understanding, solving (or dismissing) certain philosophi-
cal problems—including, centrally, the varieties of philosophical dualisms. He also 
repeats the claim made in Experience and Nature that experience does allow “any 
investigator who, by making certain observations and experiments, and by utiliz-
ing the existing body of ideas available for calculation and interpretation, [to con-
clude] that he really succeeds in fi nding out something about some limited aspect of 
nature” (59). In this sense, the foreground is “itself a portion of nature, an integral 
portion” and “nature is not just the dark abysmal unknown postulated by a reli-
gious faith in animality, especially since on such a view animality itself becomes a 
matter of faith” (60). Reviewing Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith in 1923, 
Dewey identifi es this crucial and obvious diff erence:
It is also, under Mr. Santayana’s hands, a thing of beauty for the philosopher 
for it enables him, when it is rightly envisaged, to become a complete and 
thorough sceptic as to direct knowledge of existence while it also opens to 
him an unshakable “cognitive certitude”—the being of essences which are 
the only thing worth knowing. For, as the acute reader of Mr. Santayana’s 
moral writings is aware, existence is to him inherently ridiculous, for the 
physical basis and origin of ideal goods (and of course essence is ideal) is 
comically disparate to its ideal fruits. ([1923] 1983d, 223)
In his Ethics ([1932] 1985b), Dewey assumes just the opposite to be the case: 
“Moral conceptions and processes grow naturally out of the very conditions of human 
life” (308). Dewey’s metaphysics is the vital tool with which he brings together the 
worlds of nature and mind Santayana keeps apart (Dewey 1927, 62). Dewey (1905a) 
off ers that “the lesson learned, we can think freely and naïvely in terms of things—
because things are no longer entities in a world set over against another world called 
‘mind’ or ‘consciousness,’ with some sort of mysterious ontological tie between 
them. Again, pragmatism has learned that the true meaning of subjectivism is just 
anti-dualism” (155). Detar suggests that the dualistic nature of what Dewey termed 
Santayana’s “naturalistic idealism” is what most off ended Dewey; for Dewey, nature 
was capable of generating values through human endeavors which draw on nature, 
including “religion, art, and science” (25-26). Santayana’s dualism denudes nature 
and experience of their moral possibilities. For Dewey, pluralism stands on the rec-
ognition that “there are an indefi nite multitude of heres, nows, and perspectives.” 
In fact, Dewey (1927) argues, “to swallow them up in one all-embracing substance 
is, moreover, to make the latter unknowable; it is the logical premise of a complete 
agnosticism” (63). Dewey’s metaphysics is not moralistic, but experimental. While 
it may work toward a recognition and development of moral ideals found through 
experience, these are never presented as fi nal or absolute. One of the consequences 
of Santayana’s dualistic universe is that it requires an appeal to fi xed and perma-
nent ideals which are non-negotiable and are thus unable to respond to the needs of 
humanity or democratic culture. Th e transcendent realm of ideals is antiscientifi c 
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and nonprogressive. In short, Dewey recognizes in this approach a conservatism 
which does not allow ideals and values to be grounded in experience and subjected 
to experiment and negotiation—hence its agnosticism. He gives voice to the empiri-
cist, whose “objection to the ‘high a priori road’ is that it introduces in irresponsible 
fashion a mode of presumed knowledge which may be used at any turn to stand 
sponsor for mere tradition and prejudice, and thus to nullify the results of science 
resting upon and verifi ed by observable facts (Dewey 1906, 467). 
The Pragmatist Metaphysics Debate 
Some seventy-fi ve years aft er Dewey and Santayana’s exchanges, Charlene Haddock 
Seigfried has opened the new century inquiring about “the prospects of pragmatist 
metaphysics.” Seigfried (2001) begins the most recent round in “Pragmatist Meta-
physics? Why Terminology Matters.” Her argument is straightforward: pragmatists 
“didn’t just reject the traditional subject area of metaphysics. Th ey grounded their 
analyses in the concrete conditions of everyday life. It is time to recognize that the 
formulation of these concrete conditions is a genuine alternative to metaphysics” 
(14). She blames the confusion about the pragmatists’ rejection and replacement 
of metaphysics on their continuing “talk about what had been fi rst conceived as 
metaphysical subjects.” Seigfried notes that James and Dewey do not really mean 
God when they use the term, “but varieties of religious experience or a common 
faith” (14). Seigfried is undoubtedly right about Dewey. When he writes “God” in 
A Common Faith, he explicitly does not mean an all-powerful divine being. But his 
metaphysics runs deeper than his usage of the terminology of traditional metaphys-
ics he criticizes throughout his work. 
Seigfried is correct in her assessment of pragmatism, generally, and Dewey’s 
hostility to traditional metaphysics, the epistemological turn in philosophy, and 
discussions of “the meaning of words,” and so on. But she misses a great deal by 
claiming that Dewey in particular is interested solely in lived experience, and that 
any metaphysics returns us to a dualism Dewey so obviously rejects. Seigfried fol-
lows “Pragmatist Metaphysics?” with an extended essay focusing on Dewey, “Ghosts 
Walking Underground: Dewey’s Vanishing Metaphysics” (2004). Here she contin-
ues her dismissal of Deweyan metaphysics, making roughly the same two claims: 
Dewey is always critical of traditional metaphysics (and “plainly preferred other 
designations” for his own work); and no metaphysics could possibly fi t the philo-
sophical requirements of Dewey’s pragmatism—if one did, it would no longer be 
metaphysical (53).
Perhaps the problem is with the terminology—instead of metaphysics, super-
naturalist or -ism would be more appropriate. By metaphysical, I take it Seigfried 
means an appeal to something beyond experience. For her, metaphysics distin-
guishes between experience and an absolute ideal realm. She does not allow for any 
“weaker senses of metaphysics.” Th is leads her to argue that all metaphysics displaces 
the pragmatist’s attention on immediate experience and “the primary task of the 
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intelligent transformation of given conditions toward better states of aff airs” (2004, 
54). When Seigfried uses the term metaphysical, it always represents an alternative 
to pragmatism which stands against science and resides in the supernatural, with 
its attendant dogmatic absolutism. Th is is what she calls “the metaphysical spirit” 
(55-56). Seigfried’s refusal to acknowledge the possibility of a rival or reconstructed 
metaphysics allows her always to defi ne it as appealing to fi xed principles which 
would betray any sense of naturalist philosophy. But metaphysics does not always 
yield a “metaphysical principle,” nor does it represent “something outside this 
process of human intelligence acting on natural events” (60-61). Dewey off ers his 
metaphysics as the necessary tool which allows his naturalistic philosophy to eff ect 
the transformation of society. Th e primary task of the intelligent transformation of 
given conditions toward better states of aff airs is impossible without the working of 
Dewey’s metaphysics.
William T. Myers (2004), citing much of what caught my eye in “Pragmatist 
Metaphysics?,” off ers a weaker version of metaphysics when he argues that James 
and Dewey practice a form of nonfoundational metaphysics. In other words, he 
writes, “if by metaphysics one means the search for a ‘fi rst philosophy,’ a search for 
foundations, for absolutes, for timeless truths, then, yes, [James, starting with the 
concrete] does indeed preclude that type of metaphysics” (42). Dewey, like James, 
rejects the foundational metaphysics which asks (and oft en answers) “what is the 
ultimate origin or cause of the universe?” (45). But while neither James nor Dewey 
has any patience for foundational metaphysics, both, Myers argues, are engaged in 
projects which seek to describe or explain the “generic traits of existence . . . [or] 
the features of immediate experience” (48). While I largely agree with Myers, his 
defense does not suffi  ciently correct Seigfried’s portrayal of Dewey.
More to the point, Dewey’s metaphysics serves the very goals Seigfried identi-
fi es for Dewey and the pragmatists. On her reading, however, these purposes mo-
tivate the dismissal of metaphysics as a whole. Seigfried (2004) writes that “they 
saw the growing hegemony of positivist science as a threat to the values and beliefs 
that made us most benignly human. Religion and metaphysics, the older bulwarks 
against diminished human importance, were steadily eroding as sources of en-
lightened opposition to the reductive materialism science largely represented. Th e 
problem with metaphysics was that its speculations could not produce the evidential 
warrant that scientifi c progress was constantly producing and enlarging” (54). But 
Dewey does not off er his metaphysics as a foil to science, though Seigfried assumes 
any metaphysics would be only this. Dewey’s metaphysics means to help science 
overcome the threat of becoming mere reductive materialism. Th e evidence of sci-
ence and the force of naturalistic sciences generally do not compete with metaphys-
ics, but are guided by it and so are made instrumental. Dewey does not introduce 
a “metaphysics of nature, rather than a naturalistic philosophical approach to par-
ticular experiences” as Seigfried writes (58). Rather, Dewey sees that naturalism re-
quires a metaphysics—a discussion of the ideals located in nature and experience, 
which should guide science in the service of democracy.
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Citing Experience and Nature, Seigfried (2004) both acknowledges that Dewey 
“makes these common traits [of experience] the source of values and of their pre-
cariousness,” and dismisses any value to identifying his work as pragmatist or 
naturalist metaphysics (70). Instead, she insists that the best and most helpful way 
of reading Dewey is as someone who “replace[s]” metaphysics with pragmatism. 
Because metaphysics always points away from experience, and always implies or 
requires a dualism, there is no valuable metaphysics for Seigfried. Dewey’s meta-
physics, as he argues, does neither.
As John Shook (2004) points out, Dewey’s metaphysics does not “look like 
metaphysics” to most philosophers; “where are the a priori premises, for example?” 
(731). For Shook, Dewey’s naturalism is empirical and his metaphysics pragmatic. 
Dewey does not, according to Shook, “inquire aft er any experience-independent 
reality” (732). Responding to critics of the “metaphysical Dewey,” Shook attempts 
to reshape the terms of the debate: “Dewey accepted [that nature extends beyond 
actual experience] because we do experience things as persisting while not being 
experienced (due to learning in infancy), and also as a matter of useful hypothesis 
for the advanced sort of learning called science.” Th is does not mean, however, 
that Dewey “draw[s] conclusions about transcendent matters permanently beyond 
experience” (735, 736).4
Metaphysics and Education 
Th ose who reject Dewey’s metaphysics particularly disavow any sense of the ideal 
in Dewey. Th is is the most relevant aspect of his metaphysics for discussions of edu-
cation. Th e critical response to Victor Kestenbaum’s Th e Grace and the Severity of 
the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent (2002) is informative. Many reviewers 
insist that Dewey does not imagine “an ideal realm of supersensible entities”—as 
Kestenbaum maintains in his reading of A Common Faith. If Dewey does point to 
a realm beyond experience, then his metaphysics would indeed be quite traditional. 
Instead, his crucial insight is that ideals emerge through experience as they guide 
it; they are elements of nature which do not, then, point toward or originate in the 
supernatural. Th e trick to reading Dewey—and responding to Kestenbaum—is to 
allow Dewey to naturalize metaphysics. Shane Ralston argues that the religious for 
Dewey does not open one to a transcendental reality. He writes: 
In naturalized terms, faith in the religious quality of experience is an in-
quirer’s capacity to adapt to the environment by changing his or her atti-
tudes; likewise, faith in ideality is merely the imagined outcome of trans-
forming an experienced situation in fruitful ways. Th us, for the Dewey 
scholar, plenty of evidence can be found in “Religion versus the Religious” 
[the opening chapter of A Common Faith] to support the claim, contra Kes-
tenbaum, that faith in the religious and ideal qualities of experience should 
be understood in wholly naturalistic and instrumental terms. (66, 67)
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Kestenbaum (2002) typically argues: “Dewey decisively rejects the naturalistic hope 
or expectation that by ‘unseen powers’ he simply means what has yet to be made 
visible, seeable, sensible. No. We address the unseen and invisible through faith, 
and faith is not the anticipation of an eventual visibility” (183). It is ironic that 
Kestenbaum’s Dewey is more like Santayana than Santayana himself recognized.
It should not be surprising that Ralston’s defense of Dewey, and another by 
Christine McCarthy, appear in education journals. Dewey cannot advocate for a 
reconstructed metaphysics, a democratic pedagogy based on experiential learning, 
and recognize a realm of fi xed, transcendental ideals or principles which should 
guide education (though he does seem to celebrate the ideal of democracy). Mc-
Carthy’s critique of Kestenbaum is particularly pointed:
“Transcending” experience, in either a Kantian or a Platonic sense, is in 
Dewey’s view an exceedingly bad idea. A belief that one has transcended 
experience, has “risen above” it, escaped its constraints, and is no longer 
limited by it, is a recipe for disaster. For without the limits and constraints 
of experience, one has no possible way to separate true beliefs from false 
beliefs. One would then be in the condition Kestenbaum lauds, possessed 
of an imagination that is “unreconciled to actuality.” Having thus freed 
oneself from the only means of discovering truths, one’s beliefs can only be 
unwarranted. Whether one goes on to accept with docility the fi xed prin-
ciples and unverifi able dogmas of those who claim to have seen ‘‘reality as 
it is’’ or whether one strikes out bravely to create meaning de novo without 
worrying about truth, the consequences for social life are not good. (350)5
Kestenbaum’s (2002) fi nding, that Dewey’s “pragmatism has found it neces-
sary to bracket existence and to imagine regulative ideals which cannot be traced 
back to an individual’s, society’s, or culture’s practices and the evidences they af-
ford,” off ends McCarthy and Ralston (179). Dewey has a metaphysics; but he has 
no use for the traditional metaphysics Kestenbaum describes.
While most defenses of Dewey’s metaphysics begin and end in the pages of Ex-
perience and Nature, a brief review of this and other pieces drawn from works both 
early and late, including his writings on education, allows me to make a strong case 
for a reconstructed metaphysics at the heart of Dewey’s instrumentalism, as practi-
cally applied in his work on education. In the last chapter of Experience and Nature, 
“Existence, Value, and Criticism,” Dewey (1949) introduces his “metaphysical” belief 
that “the natural world has generic as well as specifi c traits, and that in the one case 
as in the other experience is such as to enable us to arrive at their identifi cation” 
(713).6 His argument, appearing in a late rebuttal to yet another misinterpreter, is 
that experience does reveal or open one to general or generic traits which themselves 
are open to criticism, specifi cally of “values as concrete events.” Dewey writes, “the 
entire discussion, while short, is given to showing that the sense and point of recog-
nition of generic traits lies in their application in the conduct of life: that is, in their 
moral bearing provided moral can be taken in its basic broad human sense” (713). 
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Metaphysics is the seeing of value in incompleteness and progress. It represents for 
Dewey the only alternative to dogmatism, positivism, and materialism. 
We fi nd this argument in support of the location of ideals in and through 
experience throughout Dewey’s writings on education.  His basic premise is that 
education and democracy are reciprocal.  Th is claim has practical consequences for 
the classroom: “Learning which develops intelligence and character does not come 
about when only the textbook and the teacher have a say; that every individual be-
comes educated only as he has an opportunity to contribute something from his 
own experience, no matter how meagre or slender that background of experience 
may be at a given time; and fi nally that enlightenment comes from the give and 
take, from the exchange of experiences and ideas” ([1938] 1988b, 294, 296). Th e 
two alternatives to Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics, traditional metaphysics and 
positivism, both fail to refl ect properly the value of experience. Th ey are refl ected 
in a similar educational method, which either denies the possibility of moral edu-
cation through classroom experience, or dislocates values from the discovery of 
facts. A similarly harmful alternative is the antidemocratic and nationalistic edu-
cational system which imbues students with a set of non-negotiable values, whose 
purpose is to drive support of the nation. Other examples in education which fi t 
the category of traditional metaphysics include religious dogma and private reli-
gious instruction, both of which might distinguish between the pluralism of dem-
ocratic culture and the transcendence and singularity of religious belief.  Part of 
Dewey’s reconstruction of metaphysics is the recovery of belief and its application 
in a democratic context. Experience and Education begins with a description of the 
diff erence between “traditional” and “progressive” education.  Th e approach which 
parallels that of traditional metaphysics provides “standards and rules of conduct; 
moral training consists in forming habits of action in conformity with these rules 
and standards” ([1938] 1988a, 5). Dewey warns that “the failure to give constant 
attention to development of the intellectual content of experiences and to obtain 
ever-increasing organization of facts and ideas may in the end merely strengthen 
the tendency toward a reactionary return to intellectual and moral authoritarian-
ism” (58). Th e alternative off ers the “intelligently directed development of the pos-
sibilities inherent in ordinary experience” (61). 
In “Philosophy and American National Life” (1905), Dewey sets American 
philosophy against “Materialism” and “Mechanicalism,” and the “phenomena” of 
“positive observation” ([1905] 1983a, 74, 5). He argues that the ultimate questions 
of philosophy are meant to serve “the needs of democracy in America” (74). To 
achieve this, philosophy must become metaphysical, though in a new way; Dewey 
writes, “it means that in some very true sense the individual with which psychol-
ogy deals now is an ultimate; and that henceforth the metaphysical question of the 
nature and signifi cance of the individual is bound up with the scientifi c problem of 
his actual structure and behavior” (75). Before this brief quote is taken to set meta-
physics against science, it is worth noting that Dewey clearly defi nes his method, 
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and that “which must characterize American thought,” as refl ecting “an absence 
of dogmatism, of rigidly fi xed doctrines,” while presenting “a certain fl uidity and 
socially experimental quality” (76). Instrumentalism, for Dewey, is antithetical 
to a “fi nal” philosophy, and does not establish “any particular set of truths” (77).
Metaphysics, in its positive use by Dewey, represents an examination of mean-
ing and value through experience and experimentation. In his 1906 essay “Beliefs 
and Realities,” Dewey presses his naturalist case that “to believe is to ascribe value, 
impute meaning, assign import . . . It means here and now, not in some transcen-
dent sphere” ([1906] 1983b, 83). “For the world has meaning,” Dewey explains, “as 
somebody’s, somebody’s at a juncture, taken for better or worse, and you shall not 
have completed your metaphysics till you have told whose world is meant and how 
and what for—in what bias and to what eff ect. Here is a cake that is had only by 
eating it, just as there is digestion only for life as well as by life” (84). Th is brand of 
metaphysics provides an alternative both to traditional metaphysics which looks 
beyond experience to fi nd a meaning pregiven in a transcendental realm, and to 
the “Stoic dogma” of professional philosophical epistemology. Here, the terms are 
interchangeable: the errors of traditional epistemology are found, too, in the positiv-
ist conception of the possibilities and metaphysical assumptions of science. While 
Dewey may have developed a straw-man version of science, he fi nds that it too of-
ten detaches value from fact. Dewey spares little in his critique of recent trends in 
philosophy which posit an alternate reality against “the standpoint of the common 
man . . . passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete subjection to 
a ready-made and fi nished reality—physical it may be, mental it may be, logical it 
may be—is its professed ideal. Forswearing the reality of aff ection, and the gallantry 
of adventure, the genuineness of the incomplete, the tentative, it has taken an oath 
of allegiance to Reality, objective, universal, complete; made perhaps of atoms, per-
haps of sensations, perhaps of logical meanings” (85). Th e failure to recognize the 
inherence of value in experience and nature (or culture) has led, Dewey writes some 
forty years later, to the “deeply entrenched and fortifi ed habit of treating economic 
aff airs, industry, trade, and business, as mere means having no intrinsic connection 
with ‘ultimate’ ends which are moral . . .  Separation of the ‘materialistic’ and the 
‘ideal’ deprives the latter of leverage and impetus, and prevents the things to which 
the former name is applied from rendering the humane service of which they are 
capable” ([1944] 1989b, 167).
Th e strengthening of beliefs (which guide behavior) requires “the union of 
acknowledgment of moral powers and demands with thoroughgoing naturalism.” 
Th e notion of a naturalistic metaphysics does not give Dewey pause. Instead he ar-
gues that both serve each other: “If beliefs are the most natural, and in that sense, 
the most metaphysical of all things, and if knowledge is an organized technique 
for working out their implications and interrelations, for directing their formation 
and employ, how unnecessary, how petty the dear and the caution” ([1924] 1983b, 
98-99). Detaching the discussion of values from inquiry, whether scientifi c or philo-
sophical, produces the same end as relegating values to a transcendent realm that 
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is in many ways beyond ordinary human discourse. Th e duty of education, which 
Dewey ties to its proper method, is in large part grounded in its service to democ-
racy and participatory democratic engagement: it must help students develop the 
ability to express, discuss, and develop their moral reasoning.
Deweyan pragmatism, charged with the task of serving democracy, adopts the 
moral function of the metaphysical when it directs the “general concepts or ideas” 
drawn from experience toward “organizing future observations and experiences” 
([1925] 1984a, 12). Dewey labels this pragmatism’s “metaphysical implication.” He 
writes, “the doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future into 
consideration. And this taking into consideration of the future takes us to the con-
ception of a universe whose evolution is not fi nished, of a universe which is still, 
in James’ term, ‘in the making,’ ‘in the process of becoming,’ of a universe up to 
a certain point still plastic” (13). Instrumentalism, unlike traditional empiricism, 
materialism, and the version of science which Dewey dismisses, looks forward with 
the task of “reconstructing the present stage of things instead of merely knowing 
it” (18). Clearly for Dewey, metaphysics makes his empiricism instrumental and 
refl ects the mutuality of his progressive philosophies of education and democracy. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the pages of Democracy and Education, 
where Dewey reconstructs traditional approaches in education. Just as philosophi-
cal metaphysics oft en identifi es the ideal as fi xed and unchanging, and off ers ac-
cess to it through abstract reason alone, traditional education provides knowledge 
detached from the kind of forward-looking, melioristic, and experiential learning 
that Dewey supports. Th e practical eff ect of Dewey’s critique of metaphysics, as 
well as his recovery of its function is expressed succinctly in the concluding chap-
ter, “Th eories of Morals”:
Moral knowledge is thought to be a thing apart, and conscience is thought 
of as something radically diff erent from consciousness. Th is separation, if 
valid, is of especial signifi cance for education. Moral education in school 
is practically hopeless when we set up the development of character as a 
supreme end, and at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge and 
the development of understanding, which of necessity occupy the chief 
part of school time, as having nothing to do with character. On such a 
basis, moral education is inevitably reduced to some kind of catechetical 
instruction. ([1916] 1985a, 364)
Moral education only works to support democratic culture when values and 
the methods used for the students who learn them are tested, experienced, de-
bated, and oft en revised. Students must be able to think through moral problems 
and devise solutions. Training students involves developing their character—and 
this is not achieved when scientifi c knowledge is detached from moral knowledge. 
Likewise, students who are off ered set rules and fi xed principles receive the weak-
est form of moral education: they are presented with truths, and are unprepared to 
test them through experience.
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Conclusions
Th e experience of nature on which Dewey builds is Emersonian in spirit. While this 
conclusion might bring me precariously close to adding yet another sense of the 
metaphysical—as something akin to religious or religiose—Dewey’s conception of 
nature and the experience of nature never leads away from nature itself and always 
serves his larger democratic project. At the end of Quest for Certainty, the Giff ord 
Lectures Dewey delivered in 1929, four years aft er the fi rst publication of Experi-
ence and Nature and the same year as their revision and republication, he identi-
fi es the experience of nature as the path to a kind of pragmatic “religious faith.” In 
a passage which paints a romantic portrait of the possibilities of nature and brings 
to mind A Common Faith, Dewey writes:
Aspiration and endeavor are not ends in themselves; value is not in them 
in isolation but in them as means to that reorganization of the existent in 
which approved meanings are attained. Nature and society include within 
themselves projection of ideal possibilities and contain the operations by 
which they are actualized. Nature may not be worshiped as divine even 
in the sense of the intellectual love of Spinoza. But nature, including hu-
manity, with all its defects and imperfections, may evoke heartfelt piety 
as the source of ideals, of possibilities, of aspiration in their behalf, and 
as the eventual abode of all attained goods and excellencies. (1929b, 306)
P. Eddy Wilson points to A Common Faith as the text in which Dewey intro-
duces “natural piety” (329). But it seems to be in play in Experience and Nature, and 
certainly in Th e Quest for Certainty. Wilson also connects Dewey’s naturalism with 
Emerson, arguing that both hold that “the person who refl ectively reveres nature 
and who manifests that reverence for nature in practical activity is a practitioner of 
natural piety.” Th ere is a diff erence, though: “Emerson’s description of natural pi-
ety is religious, and the reverence for nature it inspires is metaphysically grounded. 
Dewey’s description of natural piety makes use of an instrumental view of religious-
ness, and the reverence for nature it inspires is subject to instrumental criteria” 
(345). Wilson notes that Dewey does not retain the transcendental commitments 
we might fi nd in Emerson and James. But experience, for Dewey, does bring forth a 
metaphysics as it, according to Th omas Gardner, leads to the disclosure of the “fun-
damental characteristics of nature” (394). “Th e generic traits of natural existence as 
disclosed by experience” provide the content of Dewey’s metaphysics which serves to 
direct the moral goods of experience toward the betterment of society (395).7 Piety 
which is mere allegiance to an absolute, or which seeks fulfi llment through a set of 
principles beyond challenge, mimics philosophical metaphysics which posits real-
ity in an ideal or supernatural realm. Natural piety, like naturalistic metaphysics, 
locates value and meaning through experience and cooperative inquiry. Dewey also 
refers to this kind of piety as “democratic faith.” In an article published the same 
month as the Normandy Invasion, Dewey dismisses in the strongest possible terms 
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the belief “that something called ‘natural law’ could be trusted, with only inciden-
tal cooperation by human beings, to bring about the desired ends.” He continues:
Th e lesson to be learned is that human attitudes and eff orts are the stra-
tegic centre for promotion of the generous aims of peace among nations; 
promotion of economic security; the use of political means in order to 
advance freedom and equality; and the worldwide cause of democratic 
institutions. Anyone who starts from this premise is bound to see that it 
carries with it the basic importance of education in creating the habits and 
the outlook that are able and eager to secure the ends of peace, democracy, 
and economic stability.” ([1944] 1989b, 257)
Two recent books bring connect Dewey’s work in philosophy and education 
with his commitment to democracy: Melvin Rogers’s Th e Undiscovered Dewey: Re-
ligion, Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy, and Gregory Fernando Pappas’s John 
Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience. Rogers adopts Dewey’s use of “democratic 
faith,” and argues that “Dewey’s understanding of religious naturalism [allows that] 
nature—broadly conceived—can generate both a sense of piety and a guiding faith 
in life without requiring a supernatural source for their intelligibility. Piety can-
not mean blind deference as we traditionally understand the term. Rather, piety 
is a critical but retrospective assessment of the narrative of experience we inhabit 
and on which we depend; it allows us to deepen our apprehension of the present” 
(2009a, 108, 109).
Th is common-sense reading of Dewey is echoed in Gregory Pappas’s book. 
Pappas dismisses the linguistic turn in philosophy, and its specifi c application in 
moral thought, by recovering the rich conception of experience in Dewey (39). 
His Dewey takes into full account the lived contexts of moral dilemmas and of-
fers philosophy as a form of criticism which examines its moral work from inside, 
without recourse to an objective perspective or appeal to fi xed and unchanging 
ideals (40, 65-68). Pappas moves Dewey beyond Putnam and Rorty by recovering 
the very approach Dewey defends against Santayana.
Clearly, in his exchange with Santayana, Dewey rejects a metaphysics which 
locates meaning and value in something static and beyond. Santayana defends an 
absolutism that Dewey rejects. Dewey’s naturalism, however, is not antimetaphysi-
cal; it is antisupernaturalism, anti any ism which places truths beyond experience 
and critique. Dewey’s brand of metaphysics provides a socially constructed ideal 
which incorporates the kind of hypothesizing and testing which makes most natu-
ralisms naturalistic. Th is, too, is the core of his progressive approach in education: 
Developing the ability to reason critically and to act morally—both of which are 
crucial to the welfare of democratic culture—requires a kind of training that can 
only be found through experiential learning. 
What then is the value of defending Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics? Sei-
gfried (2004) poses the question in these terms:
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What is odd is combining “metaphysics” with the adjective, “naturalistic,” 
given the sweeping rejections entailed in Dewey’s emphatic use of the ad-
jective. He is certainly rejecting supernaturalism in all its forms as well 
as transcendentalism. But could not one call his turn to nature the very 
essence of his naturalistic metaphysics? Th at all depends on the way he 
appeals to nature. Scientifi c inquiry into nature no more makes scientists’ 
work metaphysical than travelogues about natural features of landscapes 
do. Dewey is determined to pursue inquiries into nature in a scientifi c 
rather than metaphysical spirit. (54)
Dewey replaces metaphysics with “an account of the bio-historical develop-
ment of minded organisms in social and natural environments, an account informed 
and guided by care and concern for the quality of the transaction.” Th is, coupled 
with the “call and challenge” of experience for Dewey, leads Seigfried to conclude 
that “such a deeply existentialist explanation of change takes us very far from a 
metaphysics of being, or ‘what is,’ or what is becoming, to lived experience as the 
relevant locus of refl ection.” Simply put, then, Dewey is “post-metaphysical” (54). 
We must ask if it is particularly valuable, then, to correct Seigfried (2004) 
when she rightly points out that “metaphysics . . . takes as its aim the reconcilia-
tion or triumph of a perfect realm of being with or over the inferior world of ap-
pearance, illusion, and confusing facts.” Th is is undoubtedly one of the varieties of 
metaphysics, and not at all the type attributed to Dewey. Seigfried is convinced that 
thinking “of his project as a pragmatist metaphysics” is not at all “the best way to 
capture the enormity, profundity, and fertility of Dewey’s original analysis of the 
human condition aft er Darwin” (59, 61, 68, 70).  Respectfully, I disagree. Dewey’s 
naturalistic metaphysics is more than a new way of talking about an old way of 
thinking. Reading Dewey stripped of his metaphysics misses what makes his em-
piricism instrumental. Even as it moves beyond the individual toward the commu-
nal and cultural, Dewey’s metaphysics remains grounded in nature; it depends on 
science, experimentation, and human experience. When she writes that “Dewey is 
determined to pursue inquiries into nature in a scientifi c rather than metaphysical 
spirit,” Seigfried overlooks the function of reconstructed metaphysics, and its nec-
essary role in making science nonpositivistic. For Dewey, a naturalistic metaphysics 
animates and guides science, as well as education.
Seigfried and others oft en note that Dewey himself suggested that he might 
have replaced “experience” with “culture,” in the title of Experience and Nature. 
Seigfried (2001) concludes from this that “it is not insignifi cant that what is pre-
sumed to be his metaphysical work is called by him Experience and Nature, not 
a Metaphysics of Experience and Nature. Against many subsequent criticisms, he 
did not make any supposed metaphysical underpinnings more explicit, but tried 
to avoid misunderstandings by proposing a title even less likely to be confused 
with metaphysics, namely Culture and Nature. And yet, for lack of a better term, 
the temptation remains to call the brilliant analyses in this book, which provide a 
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background for his logic of inquiry, a metaphysics” (15).  Dewey’s regret at how his 
use of “metaphysics” is frequently misunderstood is not proof that he does not of-
fer a metaphysics. His suggestion that “culture” replace “experience” does nothing 
to unseat the meaning of his usage of experience or the focus on “the generalized 
view of ‘experience’ in Experience and Nature” (Dewey 1949, 711). He explicitly 
blames the misunderstanding on those who assume that “I regard philosophical and 
metaphysical as synonyms; or, at least, treat metaphysics as a name for that part of 
philosophy that is concerned with the relation of experience to existence, and, fur-
thermore, that I use the word metaphysical in the sense it bears in the classic tradi-
tion based on Aristotle. Nothing could be farther from the facts of the case” (712). 
Dewey intends to make sense of “metaphysics and metaphysical . . . on expe-
riential grounds, instead of upon the ground of ultimate Being behind experience 
serving as its under-pinning” (712). In fact, he insists that “this genuine subject mat-
ter is the fact that the natural world has generic as well as specifi c traits, and that 
in the one case as in the other experience is such as to enable us to arrive at their 
identifi cation. Th e entire discussion of generic traits lies in their application in the 
conduct of life: that is, in their moral bearing provided moral be taken in its basic 
broad human sense” (713). Lest Dewey be misunderstood, he does distinguish be-
tween philosophy and metaphysics. He makes this point to emphasize the usefulness 
and function of reconstructed metaphysics. He concludes, “the foregoing is not an 
apology for my use of the word ‘metaphysical.’ It is evoked by the misreading of my 
use of that word, which probably is not confi ned to Mr. Kahn” (713).
Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics involves both a critique of philosophy and a 
declaration of the imperative that pragmatism turn to experience with a scientist’s 
eye and a democrat’s concern for the improvement of society as a whole. Th e moral 
and democratic cause of Dewey’s pragmatism is lost if his metaphysics is either 
dismissed or diminished. As critique, Dewey’s approach off ers a way beyond any 
metaphysics which points away from experience and toward the supernatural.8 As 
metaphysics, Dewey’s work emphasizes the tasks still left  to philosophy, the methods 
available to education, and the centrality of the human endeavor to these disciplines.
Acknowledgment
In honor of my teacher, Mr. David A. Johnson.
Notes
1.  Boisvert off ers a clear and detailed diff erentiation between Aristotle and Dewey’s 
metaphysics. See esp. chapter 4, “Dewey’s Objections to Traditional Doctrines.”
2.  Sleeper cites John Herman Randall, Jr.’s Nature and Historical Experience (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 125.
3.  Th is parallels Santayana’s critique of Emerson. See Levinson, 113-14: “Emerson, 
Santayana concludes, leaves us with a complex religious vision of the promise and problems 
of human life, but one that still adds up to a religion of illusions, not the ‘religion of disillu-
sion’ Santayana wants. What is needed, he says, is a religion that suff ers neither from Emer-
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son’s fl ight from tradition taken as a source of authority, nor from his worn-out attempt to 
make contact with absolute reality, nor from his infatuation with poetic self-assertion, nor 
from the self-deceptions involved in identifying his own self, race, and country with God.”
4.  Shook (2004) is quick to point out that while experience may be absolute for Dewey, 
“this is not meant in the ontological sense of the idealists who wanted all existence to be within 
experience, but rather in the methodological sense that only experience ultimately supplies 
meaning to our intellectual pursuits, including metaphysics” (741-42). Shook’s description of 
Dewey paints him as phenomenalistic, that is, denying the existence of things in themselves 
and identifying reality with what is or can be experienced. Dewey, successfully or not, always 
tries to move beyond what he fi nds to be unhelpful (oft en dualistic) philosophical theories. 
When asked whether his “metaphysics include[s] any existence beyond experience,” Dewey 
(1949) answers, “my philosophical view, or theory, of experience does not include any exis-
tence beyond the reach of experience” (709). Elsewhere he writes, “speaking of the matter 
only for myself, the presuppositions and tendencies of pragmatism are distinctly realistic” 
(1905, 324).
5.  For Kestenbaum’s response, see Kestenbaum, 2007.
6.  His article is in response to S. J. Kahn’s “Experience and Existence in Dewey’s Natu-
ralistic Metaphysics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9, no. 2 (1948): 316-21.
7.  Gardner examines the question of whether Dewey’s empirical naturalism provides 
a metaphysics of existence or a metaphysics of experience. Gardner rejects the basis of the 
question: “A proper understanding of Dewey’s metaphysics undermines the very founda-
tion of this debate. I contend that Dewey would accept neither the position that Sleeper at-
tributes to him [existence] nor the position that Hook and Stuhr attribute to him [experi-
ence], because both of these positions imply a distinction between existence (or nature) and 
experience that Dewey takes great pains to reject” (399). A version of this debate is found in 
exchanges between Sholom J. Kahn and Dewey (see Kahn 1948; Dewey 1949).
For a discussion of the diff erences between Santayana’s “Spiritual Liberalism” and Dewey’s 
“Common Faith,” see Levinson 251-60.
8.  See Boisvert, especially section 3. “Change and Permanence in the Experimental 
Logic.” Boisvert is critical of Rorty and Hook’s dismissal of Dewey’s attempts “to articulate 
a metaphysics consistent with the discoveries of modern science” (5). Gale (2002), too, em-
phasizes the critical aspects of Dewey’s metaphysics.
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